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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Zackery Adams pled guilty to one count of grand theft and one count of unlawful
possession of a firearm. He received an aggregate unified sentence of nineteen years,
with eight years fixed. Mr. Adams contends that his sentence represents an abuse of
the district court’s discretion, as it is excessive given any view of the facts. He also
contends that the district court abused its discretion in awarding restitution, as he was
sentenced to a lengthy period of incarceration and established that he would be unable
to pay the restitution ordered by the district court due to his lengthy period of
incarceration.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mid-morning on March 24, 2012, officers responded to a residential area based
on a report of a suspected prowler who was jumping over fences and looking into
backyards. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.) Zachery Adams
was observed near the shrubbery of a neighbor’s house, acting strangely and
apparently trying to hide behind bushes and plants. (PSI, p.3.) Officers saw Mr. Adams
going toward a porta potty and noticed he was bleeding from his hand. (PSI, p.3.)
However, when officers made contact with Mr. Adams and tried to detain him, he ran
away, leaving behind a backpack containing items taken in a previous burglary. (PSI,
p.3.)
Approximately five hours later, officers responded to a citizen who had just seen
an unknown male inside her house. (PSI, p.4.) She also reported that she was missing
two pistols. (PSI, p.4.) When an officer approached the area from which the call
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originated, he saw multiple people pointing at a house and Mr. Adams in the backyard
of a different house, by the homeowner’s boat. (PSI, p.4.) Mr. Adams was taken into
custody, and a search of his belongings revealed numerous items, including a loaded
revolver and a small container containing a substance that tested positive for
methamphetamine. (PSI, p.4.) Mr. Adams recalled walking into the house (from which
he took the weapons) and petting a dog, and he was wearing the homeowner’s yellow
shirt when he was arrested. (PSI, pp.3-4.) Mr. Adams was under the influence of
methamphetamine and only recalled bits and pieces of the day due to his drug use in
combination with his mental health conditions. (PSI, p.7.)
Based on these facts, Mr. Adams was arrested and charged by Information with
grand theft, burglary, felony possession of a controlled substance, felony unlawful
possession of a firearm, misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, misdemeanor
resisting or obstructing, and misdemeanor providing false information. (R., pp.38-40.)
Mr. Adams was also charged with a persistent violator sentencing enhancement.
(R., pp.64-66.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Adams entered an Alford1 plea to one count of
grand theft and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. (2/19/16 Tr., p.28, Ls.1324.) As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges
and the persistent violator sentencing enhancement.

(2/19/16 Tr., p.1, Ls.11-25;

R., p.76.) The district court accepted Mr. Adams’s guilty plea, ordered a PSI and a
mental health evaluation, and set the matter for sentencing. (2/19/16 Tr., p.28, L.25 –
p.29, L.15; R., pp.71-73.)

1

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
2

At sentencing, the State recommended a unified term of fourteen years, with ten
years fixed, on the grand theft count, and five years indeterminate, on the possession of
a firearm count, and asked the court to order the sentence on the grand theft count to
be served consecutively to a parole hold from a 2010 conviction. (4/20/16 Tr., p.14,
Ls.1-8.) Mr. Adams’ counsel asked the court to retain jurisdiction to allow him “to show
the court that he will take advantage of treatment.” (4/20/16 Tr., p.25, L.23 – p.26, L.2.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Adams to fourteen years, with eight years fixed, on the
grand theft count and five years indeterminate on the possession of a firearm count.
(4/20/16 Tr., p.35, L.4 – p.36, L.21; R., pp.85-89.)

The district court ordered the

possession sentence to be served consecutively to the grand theft sentence. (4/20/16
Tr., p.35, L.20 – p.36, L.21; R., p.86.)
Mr. Adams timely appealed from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.91-93, 101104.)
A hearing was held on the State’s motion for restitution. Defense counsel did not
disagree with the amount of restitution requested, but objected to a restitution order in
light of Mr. Adams’ financial circumstances—Mr. Adams would not be able to pay the
restitution due to his lengthy period of incarceration. (8/15/16 Tr., p.3, L.22 - p.4, L.17.)
The district court ordered restitution in the amount of $267.00. (R., pp.107-112.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Adams to an
aggregate unified sentence of nineteen years, with eight years fixed, following his
pleas of guilty to grand theft and possession of a firearm?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in awarding restitution?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Adams To An
Aggregate Unified Sentence Of Nineteen Years, With Eight Years Fixed, Following His
Pleas Of Guilty To Grand Theft And Possession Of A Firearm
Mr. Adams asserts that, given any view of the facts, his aggregate unified
sentence of nineteen years, with eight years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant
contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public
interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.’”

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Adams does not allege that
his total sentences exceed the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an

abuse of discretion, Mr. Adams must show that in light of the governing criteria, the
sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of Mr. Adams’ rehabilitative potential, the district court abused its
discretion in sentencing him excessively. The district court failed to fully consider the
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fact that Mr. Adams was extremely remorseful and the incident was the result of his
mental health conditions and use of controlled substances.
Mr. Adams has had a very difficult life. His childhood up to high school was filled
with enough serious abuse that defense counsel commented that Mr. Adams had “one
of the worst childhoods that I have seen.” (4/20/16 Tr., p.20, Ls.7-8.) Mr. Adams was
“abused and victimized by almost every authority figure that was in charge of him”
(4/20/16 Tr., p.20, Ls.9-15) and this is well documented in Mr. Adams’ PSI (PSI, pp.1213).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered
as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v.
Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982). In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence
based on Nice’s lack of prior record and the fact that “the trial court did not give proper
consideration of the defendant’s alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing
defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem.”
Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and
alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of conduct, could be a
mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 (1981).
Mr. Adams suffers from drug addiction.

(PSI, p.20.)

He began using

methamphetamine when he was sixteen years old, and began using opiates when he
was twenty-four years old. (PSI, p.19.) Mr. Adams was using controlled substances at
the time of the incident; however, he wants drug treatment. (PSI, pp.7, 20.) The day of
the incident, Mr. Adams reported that he had begun seeing things that were not there
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and hearing voices (due to his mental health condition) and that his methamphetamine
use only made the hallucinations worse. (PSI, p.7.)
Mr. Adams has long struggled with severe mental illness. (PSI, pp.16-17.) The
Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial court
to consider a defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132
Idaho 573, 581 (1999). Mr. Adams describes his mental health as “shaky” and reported
a history of mental illness including Bipolar Disorder, Depression, Complex PTSD,
Anxiety Disorder, Antisocial Personality Disorder, Schizoaffective Disorder, and ADHD.
(PSI, pp.16-17.) During the pendency of this case, the district court ordered a mental
health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 18-211 for Mr. Adams prior to his preliminary
hearing. (R., p.24.) Mr. Adams was found unfit to proceed and was committed to the
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, pursuant to I.C. § 18-212. (R., pp.26-27.)
Mr. Adams was sent to State Hospital South where he remained committed for two
months. (2/19/16 Tr., p.4, Ls.7-18; PSI, p.18.) He wants mental health counseling and
understands that he cannot cope with his problems on his own. (PSI, p.19.)
Further, Mr. Adams was extremely remorseful for his acts. Mr. Adams told the
district court:
First of all, I apologize. . . I am beyond sorry for what I did. I can’t even
begin to express, I don’t feel sorry for myself. I feel bad that I put fear in
these people’s lives and I took their security away from them. I didn’t
mean to do that. That was not my intentions. . . I felt safe. I’ve been
running for a long time, and there’s nothing I can do or say that is going to
change how you guys feel. I just hope that you can know that what has
been said to your from the court, from the prosecutor, is not defined who I
am. I’m not a villainous person. I don’t go out of my way to hurt people.
I’ve never hurt anybody.
I’m just sorry. I really am. And I hope that you can forgive me. I don’t
know what is going to happen right now, but besides what the court is
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going to do and I hope that you can forgive me and hope that you don’t
hold any grudges towards anybody else that comes along your path that
may have a felony or may have -- not everybody’s bad. And I’m sorry for
what I did. Thank you.
(4/20/16 Tr., p.26, L.12 – p.27, L.15.)
Mr. Adams, in his PSI Questionnaire, wrote, “I feel sick. I felt I was okay. Im sick
with remorse because I cant remember doing it yet I know Im responsible (sic).” (PSI,
p.6.) Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant expresses
remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. State v. Shideler, 103
Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Adams asserts that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts
that had the district court properly considered his drug use, mental health condition, and
sincere remorse, it would have imposed a less severe sentence.

II.
The District Court Erred When It Ordered Mr. Adams To Pay $267.00 In Restitution

A.

Introduction
Mr. Adams challenges the district court’s restitution order for him to pay $267.00

to the homeowners for a pair of broken sunglasses and to rekey the locks. He asserts
that the district court abused its discretion by failing to reach its decision by an exercise
of reason when it failed to adequately consider his current and future inability to pay.
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B.

Standard Of Review
“‘The decision regarding whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is

within the district court’s discretion,’ guided by factors in Idaho Code section
19-5304(7).” State v. Hurles, 158 Idaho 569, 573 (2015) (quoting State v. Corbus, 150
Idaho 599, 602 (2011)).
When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether
the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices
before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason.
State v. Torrez, 156 Idaho 118, 120 (Ct. App. 2014).

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Reach Its Decision By An
Exercise Of Reason When It Ordered Mr. Adams To Pay Restitution In Light Of
His Current And Future Inability To Pay
“Idaho’s restitution statute permits a court to order restitution for ‘any crime which

results in an economic loss to the victim.’” Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602 (quoting I.C. § 195304(2)). “In determining an amount for restitution, a court must consider a defendant’s
indigency.”

State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 398 (Ct. App. 2012).

“Idaho

Code § 19-5304(7) provides that a court “shall consider . . . the financial resources,
needs and earning ability of the defendant.” State v. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 379 (Ct. App.
2004).

A defendant’s inability to pay alone does not preclude or limit a restitution

award, but it is a factor that the district court must consider when “it makes a
discretionary restitution determination.” Id. The district court may consider an indigent
defendant’s “future ability to pay,” such as, for example, the defendant’s “business
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acumen to earn money for restitution upon his eventual release from prison.” State v.
Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 543 (Ct. App. 1989).
Here, Mr. Adams contends that the district court failed to adequately consider his
inability to pay restitution. The State requested $267.00 which was for the homeowner
“to rekey his home for $87, and then his wife’s sunglasses were broken, and so they
replaced those sunglasses for $180.” (8/15/16 Tr., p.6, Ls.15-18.) Defense counsel
agreed that restitution was appropriate, but asked the district court to exercise its
discretion and not order restitution in light of Mr. Adams’ inability to pay due to his
lengthy period of incarceration. (8/15/16 Tr., p.4, L.6 – p.6, L.9.) In ordering Mr. Adams
to pay restitution, the district court provided:

“[T]he Court recognizes that Adams’

current financial resources and earning ability are limited. Adams also suffers from
significant mental health issues. At the same time, Adams has a GED and appears to
be able-bodied.” (R., p.111.) While the district court did wisely exercise discretion by
ordering Mr. Adams to pay restitution only to the homeowners, and not for drug testing,
Mr. Adams asserts that the district court erred by giving little weight to his current
inability to pay due to his incarceration and by expecting that he could obtain work
because he “appears able-bodied.” (R., p.111.) Mr. Adams has neither the present nor
future ability to pay $267.00 in restitution.
As shown by the presentence investigation, Mr. Adams does not have the
financial resources or current earning ability to pay restitution.

While Mr. Adams

completed the 10th grade and obtained his GED, Mr. Adams has severe mental health
conditions which cause him problems with holding steady employment. (PSI, pp.15-17.)
As a result, Mr. Adams has had several jobs, but only works each job for a maximum of
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one month. (PSI, p.16.) In this case, Mr. Adams was sentenced nineteen years, with
eight years fixed. He will be incarcerated for at least the next eight years, with no
opportunity to pay his restitution. This information demonstrates that Mr. Adams lacks
any current or future financial resources to pay restitution.
Further, there is little hope that Mr. Adams will develop the future ability to pay
the restitution in full. Unlike the defendant in Bybee, who possessed some “business
acumen,” Mr. Adams has no such skills. In light of Mr. Adams’ situation, the district
court should have exercised its discretion to decline to award restitution.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Adams respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district
court for a new sentencing hearing. Mr. Adams also requests that this Court vacate the
district court’s restitution order.
DATED this 7th day of February, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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